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I.   Introduction
{1} The World Wide Web (WWW) is so often used as a way of interacting with the Internet that many people
mistakenly confuse the two, referring to the Internet as the "Web" and vice versa. Of course, the Internet and
its native applications predate the development of the WWW protocols by decades.[2] Still, given the
overwhelming amount of available Internet bandwidth now devoted to the transmission of web pages, there is
no doubt that the WWW is the interface of choice for most users of the world's most pervasive computer
network.[3] The WWW is not the Internet, but there can be no doubt that it is the Internet's first "killer app."
[4]
{2} Simply put, the WWW is a set of protocols that facilitates access to geographically dispersed data via a
multimedia graphical user interface. When a user peruses material made available via these protocols (a
process called "browsing"), references to related material on the WWW might be presented as "links." These
links allow the user to access the referenced material, which may contain links of its own. So, for instance, a
footnote in an article published on the WWW might not just provide a citation to a related article, but might,
if selected, actually display the source material in its entirety. It is linking that makes the WWW web-like,
with documents seamlessly referencing and cross-referencing each other. The result is that browsing the
WWW differs fundamentally from traditional means of research, in that it is inherently non-linear. Users can
jump from one document to another, following a unique course on an indirect pathway through cyberspace.
{3} However, WWW linking raises some interesting legal questions. Does the provision of a link implicate
intellectual property rights? Is there potential liability which attaches for unauthorized linking? This paper
addresses these and related questions. In part II, we examine the nature of the WWW protocols and explain
what actually happens in the process of linking. In part III, we describe some interesting real-world fact
patterns that highlight some of the unique intellectual property issues that can arise on the WWW. Part IV is a
review of copyright principles in light of the WWW and the unique linking problems previously identified.
Part V discusses some possible defenses to copyright infringement claims based on linking. Finally, in Part
VI, we briefly explore intellectual property doctrines other than copyright that might come into play.
 
II.   Background
{4} Documents on the WWW are encoded pursuant to a set of standards called HyperText Markup Language,
or HTML.[5] HTML documents are text files containing content text (i.e., the information to be displayed to
a user) and HTML instructions. Programs called "browsers"[6] are applications that interpret[7] the HTML
instructions in a marked-up document and, in accordance with these instructions, display the document's
content to the user. Many HTML instructions denote special formatting for the content text. For instance, in
an HTML encoded document, the command <B>Hello!</B> directs the user's browser to display the text
"Hello!" in bold text. Other HTML instructions coordinate the placement of tables or forms amidst the
content text.
{5} Some HTML instructions are used to identify/locate other hypertext elements. These instructions are
referred to as "links." Links are often, although not exclusively, denoted by emphasized text or by "clickable"
icons. When a user selects a link, the user's browser program interprets the HTML instruction associated with
that link to locate, retrieve, and process the link's target. The target might be another HTML document, an
image, a video segment, an audio file, or some combination of these elements.
{6} For purposes of this paper, we identify two generic classes of links (local and remote) and two link
attributes (invoke-to-load and auto-load). Local links are links in one HTML document (the parent document)
that refer to a document or element stored at the same physical site as the parent document. Remote links are
embedded in the parent document and point to a document or element stored at a site other than that where
the parent document resides. Invoke-to-load links require a user to affirmatively select or invoke them before
the link's target is located and displayed. Auto-load links are invoked automatically by the user's browser
when the parent document containing the link is displayed. Auto-load links are typically used to display
images "in-line" with the parent document's text, giving the appearance that the image is a "part of" the parent
document.
{7} Either attribute can be applied to either class of link, making four types of links possible: (1) local
invoke-to-load, (2) local auto-load, (3) remote invoke-to-load, and (4) remote auto-load. For example, in a
WWW rendition of a newspaper article, an accompanying photograph might be displayed by an auto-load
link to an image file. Since it is of the auto-load variety, the link will instruct the user's browser to pull up the
image automatically when the article's text is displayed. The result of an auto-load link like this is often
referred to as an "in-line image." If the image is stored on the same computer as the article's text file, then the
link is a local link. If the image is stored elsewhere, then the link is a remote link. Other related photographs
might be indicated on the page by invoke-to-load links. To see these, the user would have to manually click
on an icon or highlighted text indicating their availability. Again, these might be locally or remotely stored.
{8} In addition to understanding the distinction between different types of links that might be implemented in
a given WWW page, it is important to understand some other interesting technical characteristics of the
WWW. First, HTML documents are strictly limited to plain (ASCII) text. They do not contain images, sounds
or other non-textual elements. In order for an image to be displayed concurrently with the document, a link to
the image element (either local or remote) is necessary. Even somewhat simple web pages, then, might
contain a large number of links to elements that make up the page's formatting.
{9} Second, links only identify the location of a target element, such as an HTML document or an image, and
are not the element themselves. Embedding a link in an HTML document is not the same as actually placing
the element in the document. Third, it is the user's browser that interprets the HTML instruction identified by
the link. So, when the browser encounters a link, it initiates the network connection to the referenced
element, facilitates the transmission of a copy of the element to the user's computer, and then processes the
element so that it can be appropriately displayed (or, in the case of an audio file, heard).
 
III.   Fact Patterns
{10} Recently, some interesting fact patterns have emerged that pose fundamental questions about the legal
implications of linking. Two particularly intriguing situations are worthy of examination in that they highlight
how quickly legal issues involving linking can become complex.
A. The Dilbert Hack Page
{11} The popular Dilbert comic strip chronicles the experiences of Dilbert, a corporate drone who is faced
with the bureaucracy and mediocrity of the modern workplace. United Feature Syndicate, Inc. (UM),
copyright owners of the Dilbert comic strip, maintain an Internet website where users can view recent Dilbert
cartoons, purchase Dilbert related products, and contact either UM or the comic's author, Scott Adams.[8] In
January 1996, a Princeton University graduate student[9] created a WWW site he called the Dilbert Hack
Page[10] (DHP) which allowed users to view recent Dilbert comics in a context different from that provided
by UM.
{12} The DHP used the names of Dilbert comic image files, obtained from the UM Dilbert site each day, to
generate a remote auto-load link that was written into the DHP's HTML document (as ASCII text). When
visitors to the DHP subsequently downloaded (browsed) the DHP's HTML document to their computer, the
remote auto-load link HTML instructions were interpreted by the user's browser which, in turn, contacted
UM's Dilbert site, downloaded the links' identified image files, and displayed the targeted image files. See
Figure 1.
{12} For analytical purposes, it is important to note that the DHP HTML page did not contain the
subsequently displayed Dilbert image files. The DHP's author never duplicated the Dilbert cartoons at all.
What the DHP HTML page did, however, is identify the precise location (computer site and file name) of the
targeted Dilbert image files and, based on this information, the image files were obtained directly from UM's
Dilbert site by the user's browser for incorporation into the DHP as displayed on the user's computer. In July
1996, UM contacted the DHP's author informing him that Dilbert comic strips were the intellectual property
of UM and could not be used without their express written consent.[11] A subsequent letter by UM's legal
counsel alleged the DHP was a clear copyright violation and threatened legal action.[12] In the face of an
uncertain liability, the DHP was removed from active service in August 1996.[13]
B. TotalNEWS
{13} Another intriguing fact pattern involves a web-based news clearinghouse called TotalNEWS.[14]
TotalNEWS uses frame technology[15] to display content from a number of different news sources while the
user continues to see the TotalNEWS Logo and associated advertisements. Through frames, TotalNEWS
divides a browser's window into four separate regions as shown in Figure 2. Region 1 contains a number of
links to news sources such as CNN®, CBS®, and USA Today®. Region 2 contains a logo that alternates
between TotalNEWS' logo and that of an advertiser. Region 3 contains content; when a user selects one of the
links in region 1, information from that news provider is displayed in region 3. Region 4 contains an ever
changing assortment of advertisements.[16]
{14} TotalNEWS' use of frames in this manner allows the site's administrators to display their logo (and
advertisements) while simultaneously displaying the content from other unaffiliated sources. Unless the
targeted content provider (e.g., CBS®) prominently displays its logo or other identifying mark in each
portion of information it provides, users browsing TotalNEWS' website could be confused as to whose
information they are viewing. In February 1997, a number of news entities to whom TotalNEWS was linking
filed suit alleging, among other things, copyright and trademark infringement and that their content is being
passed off (at least to some users) as that of someone else.[17]
{15} In June of 1997 the parties entered a stipulation[18] that required defendant TotalNEWS to "cease the
practice of 'framing' Plaintiffs' websites"[19]except via plain text links.[20] As we argue later,[21] it appears
that TotalNEWS would not be liable under copyright law, but is nonetheless bound by its stipulation with
Plaintiff news organizations.
 
IV.   Analysis
{16} Under the present incarnation of the copyright act[22] (hereinafter referred to as the Act), copyright
adheres instantly in "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."[23] Since
original "means only that the work was independently created by the author . . . and that it possesses at least
some minimal degree of creativity,"[24] and a work is "fixed in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived [or] reproduced . . . for a
period of more than transitory duration,"[25] it would appear that virtually all WWW publications are eligible
for copyright protection[26]
{17} Benefits of copyright spring from the Act's grant of exclusive rights to the copyright owner.[27] The Act
recognizes six exclusive rights: (1) reproduction,[28] (2) preparation of derivative works,[29] (3) public
distribution, (4-5) public performance or display[30] and (6) public performance via digital audio
transmission.[31] These rights may be exercised directly by the author or through third parties via assignment
or license.[32] They may even be exercised in the negative, through the prohibition of all uses.[33]
{18} Notwithstanding the grant of broad rights provided the copyright owner in Section 106, Sections 107
through 121 of the Act set forth a number of specific limitations.[34] Further, case law tells us that one cannot
obtain a copyright on facts,[35] information in the public domain,[36] scenes of faire,[37] cliché language
and metaphors.[38]
{19} To be held liable under copyright principles, the party creating a link to the copyrighted material
(hereinafter, the "linking party") must qualify as either a "direct infringer" or some sort of "contributory
infringer." It is important, then, to understand the differences between these two doctrines before analyzing
the scope of link-related liability.
A. Direct Infringement
{20} The Act provides that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is an
infringer."[39] Two elements must be established to prove infringement: (1) ownership of a valid copyright,
and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.[40] Importantly, the Act does not
require intent on the infringer's part.[41] If a party's acts are sufficient to satisfy these two elements, then that
party is considered a "direct infringer" and is subject to liability.[42]
{21} Of particular interest here is the effect a single act on the WWW (e.g., browsing a home page) has on
the copyright owner's enumerated rights.[43] The act of retrieving documents or HTML elements on the
WWW might implicate a variety of the enumerated rights in somewhat different ways depending on the
circumstances.[44] For instance, the Ninth Circuit has held that the requisite "copying" for infringement
purposes can occur when a computer program is transferred from permanent storage to a computer's Random
Access Memory (RAM).[45] Other courts have extrapolated this fundamental rule and found that an "upload
or download" of a computer file from a remote computer system similarly qualifies as the type of copying
that implicates the author's exclusive rights.[46]
{22} Also potentially implicated when WWW materials are perused are the display,[47] public distribution,
[48] and derivative[49] rights. In Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,[50] the defendant removed
artwork from purchased books, affixed the artwork to a tile, and resold the tile for commercial gain.[51]
Without analysis, the Ninth Circuit found him liable for violating the copyright owner's right to make and
authorize the creation of derivative works. In Lee v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,[52] a case having virtually the
same facts as Mirage, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the copyright owner's derivative right was not
violated. The Lee court reasoned that merely bonding artwork to a tile was analogous to framing a picture, an
act that does not change, recast, adapt, or transform the original artwork.[53] The court noted that to hold
otherwise would be to make "criminals out of art collectors and tourists,"[54] and anyone else who frames a
purchased artwork.[55]
{23} Under the guise of enforcing a copyright owner's derivative right, the Mirage court has, in effect,
expanded an author's moral rights beyond those provided by statute. Specifically, the Copyright Act limits an
author's moral rights to "prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
modification of that work is a violation of that right."[56] Even these rights are limited to "works of visual
art" which is itself restricted to mean either a painting, drawing, print, sculpture or still photographic image,
existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author.[57]
{24} Some courts have held that "authorizing" another's infringing conduct is itself a direct infringement.[58]
But legislative history indicates that "[u]se of the phrase 'to authorize' [in 17 U.S.C. § 106] is intended to
avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers."[59] Not surprisingly, then, other courts,
have expressed doubt as to whether 'authorization' constitutes a separate method of direct infringement.[60]
{25} Is there a direct infringing act during the linking process? A quick review of the scenarios discussed in
Section II seems to indicate that, at least in circumstances similar to the one posed by the Dilbert Hack Page
and the TotalNEWS service, the only possible direct infringer would be the end user. That is because the
linking party is not doing anything that seems to involve a direct manipulation of the copyrighted materials at
all. As one set of commentators note, "they [the linking party] do not perform an act of copying - the essential
element for copyright infringement liability."[61] Because of the nature of the underlying technology, all of
the acts that appear to be infringements (reproductions, distributions, and displays) are performed by the end
user who is accessing the content directly. The linking party's only role in the process is the provision of
information about how such access can be accomplished. This information takes the form of a Uniform
Resource Locator (URL)[62] with which the user effectuates (via their browser program) the retrieval and
manipulation of the copyrighted material.
{26} Even if a court were to take an expansive and liberal interpretation of the linking party's role and argue
that the linking party was somehow taking the copyrighted work and manipulating it (which they are not), it
seems that the only claim would be one similar to the one in Mirage. [63] However, the more persuasive Lee
analysis seems to clear the linking party of any real concern.[64]
{27} While no court has yet been faced with a linking fact pattern, courts faced with the somewhat similar
situation of computer bulletin board system operator liability have usually found that an intermediary system
operator is not appropriately viewed as a direct infringer when the system's end users are the actors primarily
responsible for direct manipulation of the copyrighted material.[65] Where courts have deviated from this
finding, their reasoning is questionable.[66] Significantly, unlike the scenarios described here, the cases
which hold that the system operator is not a direct infringer have involved situations where the copyrighted
material is actually stored and processed on the system operator's computers. Nonetheless, the courts
addressing these cases refrained from finding the system operators responsible for direct infringement.[67] It
seems untenable for courts to hold linking parties liable as direct infringers for similar reasons, and the courts
should turn to some other theory of liability as the source for copyright owners' relief.[68]
 
B. Third Party Liability - Contributory Infringement
{28} Unlike federal patent law, the Copyright Act "does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement
committed by another."[69] The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude
the imposition of liability.[70] As defined by the Second Circuit, "[o]ne who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be
held liable as a 'contributory' infringer."[71] Importantly, there can be no contributory infringement unless
there is an actual direct infringement by a third party.[72] Still, where a party is implicated in copyright
infringement, yet has not precipitated the acts required for a direct infringement claim, contributory
infringement may be the proper vehicle for assessing liability.
{29} Courts have recognized two types of contributory infringers: those who provide the means (usually a
product) to infringe, and those whose physical conduct participates in or furthers the infringement.[73]
Means to Infringe
{30} One type of contributory infringement is "means to infringe" liability. For a means to infringe cause of
action to accrue, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant knowingly created an instrumentality for
infringing one or more of the owner's exclusive rights which (2) had no substantial non-infringing use, and
(3) the existence of direct infringement. [74] If these elements are established, liability attaches regardless of
either the amount of control the defendant has over the direct infringer or whether they have an economic
interest in the infringing activity.[75]
{31} In the landmark case of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,[76] television program
copyright holders alleged that the sale of video tape recorders (VTRs) allowed consumers to conduct illicit
copying of television programs.[77] The plaintiffs argued that the VTR manufacturers should be held liable
as contributory infringers since they (Sony, et al.) manufactured and marketed VTRs.[78] Borrowing patent
law's test of substantial non-infringing use, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the VTRs are capable of a
substantial non-infringing use, and, therefore, the defendants should not be held liable for contributory
infringement.[79] The substantial non-infringing use relied on by the Court was "time-shifting,"[80] which
occurs when consumers tape a television program for viewing at a later date.[81] Although, at first glance,
time-shifting seems to constitute a direct infringement by the consumer/viewer, the Court held that it was a
protected fair use under the Copyright Act, and, thus, did not amount to infringement.[82] The dissent
criticized the substantial non-infringing use test, arguing that only very unimaginative manufacturers could
not delineate a substantial non-infringing use for most technologies, even if the technology was primarily
designed for infringement.[83]
{32} How does this test play out for technologies other than video recorders? Some otherwise troubling
scenarios become easy to analyze under the Sony test. For example, a library that makes photocopiers
available to the public is clearly facilitating infringement in cases where library visitors use the copiers for
illicit copying, but since the photocopier has substantial non-infringing uses, the library should not be
considered a contributory infringer.[84] Courts have also applied the Sony test in the context of computer
software. In Telerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro,[85] the court relied on the Sony test in holding a software
manufacturer liable for contributory infringement.[86] The defendants' alleged primary non-infringing use
was, in actuality, the main infringing activity.[87] However, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,[88] the
Fifth Circuit used the Sony test in holding a software manufacturer not liable for contributory infringement on
the basis that its program had substantial non-infringing uses.[89] The Vault court reached this conclusion
even though the manufacturer conceded that it had actual knowledge that its product was used to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.[90]
Participatory Infringement
{33} Another form of contributory infringement is often called "participatory" infringement. For a
participatory infringement cause of action to accrue, a plaintiff must show the defendant had (1) knowledge
of a (2) direct infringement by another, and (3) induced, caused, or materially contributed to that infringing
activity.[91]
{34} In Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.,[92] the infringer violated plaintiff's
copyrights on certain musical compositions by copying and reproducing an unauthorized album.[93] The
plaintiff sued not only the organization who produced the album, but also an advertising agency for placing
non-infringing advertisements for the sale of the infringing albums, a radio station for broadcasting such
advertisements, and a packaging agency for shipping the infringing albums.[94] The court held that the
advertising agency, the radio station, and the packaging agency could be liable for contributory infringement
if they knew or should have known the infringing nature of the specific albums.[95] In Gershwin Publishing
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management[96], the defendant was a manager of concert artists and a creator and
producer of local concert associations which provided audiences for its artists.[97] The court found the
defendant liable for contributory infringement because the defendant knew that its artists included
copyrighted compositions in their performances and that neither its local associations nor its performing
artists had secured copyright licenses.[98] The court in that case described the defendant's activities as
"pervasive participation"[99] and agreed with the lower court that the defendant "caused this copyright
infringement."[100]
{35} The Ninth Circuit's recent opinion in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc.[101] highlights how courts
struggle with the parameters of the participatory infringement doctrine. In the lower court's opinion, a
California Federal District Court discussed the issue of how much participation is needed to trigger
contributory infringement.[102] The defendant was the owner of a swap meet at which independent vendors
were selling counterfeit music tapes.[103] Although the district court accepted plaintiff's assertion that the
defendant knew the illegal activities were occurring, it nevertheless held that the defendant's actions were
passive and not substantial enough to constitute contributory infringement.[104] "Merely renting booth space
is not 'substantial participation' in the vendor's infringement activities."[105] In addition, the district court
noted that the plaintiffs failed to plead how the defendant acted "in concert with the vendors to accomplish
the purpose or plan of selling counterfeits."[106] In reversing the District Court, the Ninth Circuit disagreed,
holding that "providing the site and facility for known infringing activities is sufficient to establish
contributory liability."[107]
The Linking Party as a Contributory Infringer
{36} Assuming, for the moment, that the end user's activities are deemed to be direct infringements,[108]
does the linking party act in such a way as to satisfy the elements necessary to establish contributory
infringement? In certain circumstances, it may. The relevant inquiry becomes: what type of link is involved?
Arguably, where the linking party sets up a remote invoke-to-load link to copyrighted material on a Web
page, it seems plausible that the linking party no more "participates" in or "materially contributes" to the acts
of the user than the author of a traditional paper-based article who provides a footnote to a supporting
authority or an entry in a bibliography.[109] Despite the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Fonovisa, recent opinions
dealing with on-line service operator liability for a user's infringing acts seem to imply that simply providing
the facilities through which infringement is committed is not the "substantial participation" needed to support
a participatory infringement claim.[110] Here, the linking party seems to have even less involvement.
Certainly, then, for an invoke-to-load link, at least, simply establishing the link seems equally unlikely to
meet this threshold.
{37} If the link in question is an auto-load link, however, it may be the case that the link looks and functions
more like a "means to infringe" or that the linking party so substantially participates in the user's acts that the
linking party can be deemed a participatory infringer. The end user need not act at all here - his or her
browser is directed to act by the HTML coding implemented by the linking party. This HTML code could
very well be deemed a means-to-infringe. Also, the provision of this code approaches substantial
participation in a way that providing an invoke-to-load link does not.
{38} The situation is muddied when it comes to framed sites like TotalNEWS where an invoke-to-load link
results in a composite page on the user's screen that contains the copyrighted material as a constituent
component. If the user's browsing is somehow deemed to be infringing, then the linking party responsible for
the framed site runs the risk of liability as both a participatory infringer and for creating a means to infringe.
Providing this type of link would seem even more likely to represent the requisite substantial participation in
the end user's direct infringement for purposes of participatory infringement. Moreover, since the link would
function as the "instrumentality" for the users' infringing act, it would likely be deemed a "means to infringe"
as well. In none of the situations described thus far does the linking party have the opportunity to defend a
means-to-infringe claim on the grounds that the link has substantial non-infringing use, as the only purpose
for the unauthorized links in these examples is to act as an instrumentality for infringement.[111]
 
V.   End-User Defenses
{39} If the act of setting up a link is, as we argue, not in and of itself an act that implicates the linking party
in a direct infringement claim, then the only way the party might be found liable under the copyright law is
under a theory of contributory infringement as described above. As noted, the contributory infringement
doctrine requires that the end user (who performs the processes that implicates the Act) be deemed a direct
infringer.[112] However, when one closely reviews the end user's activities in a WWW linking scenario,
traditional defenses to infringement come into play that appear to obviate the end user's liability. This shields
the linking party as well, since there is no direct infringement upon which to base the finding of contributory
infringement. This is exactly what happened in Sony, where the court's determination that the consumer was
engaged in fair use precluded a finding of contributory infringement on the part of the video tape recorder
manufacturer.[113] In this section, we discuss two possible defenses, implied license and fair use, and
contend that in an unauthorized linking situation, one or both will usually make it unlikely that the end user
qualifies as a direct infringer, and thus the linking party is not properly viewed as a contributory infringer.
[114]
A. The Implied Non-exclusive License Defense
{40} While a copyright owner can always sell or license his or her exclusive rights to third parties, Section
204 of the Copyright Act invalidates such a transfer of ownership unless it is in writing.[115] A transfer of
copyright ownership is an "assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation or
hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright but not including a
non-exclusive license."[116] Courts have recognized that this section assures that the creator of the work will
not give away a copyright inadvertently and forces parties who want to use the work to negotiate with the
creator to determine precisely what rights are being transferred and at what price.[117]
{41} The language of Section 101 specifically removes non-exclusive licenses from the writing requirement
of Section 204.[118] Non-exclusive licenses occur where the licenser-owner of the work permits the use of
the work in a particular manner without transferring ownership of the copyright to the licensee.[119] The
existence of any license, whether exclusive or non-exclusive, creates an affirmative defense to a claim of
copyright infringement.[120]
{42} It is well established that non-exclusive licenses may be granted orally, or may even be implied from
conduct of the parties.[121] According to Nimmer, the existence of non-exclusive licenses "is not expressly
provided in the statutory text, but is negatively implied from the fact that a 'transfer of copyright ownership,'
which by definition does not include non-exclusive licenses must be by written instrument."[122] Thus, the
copyright owner can grant a non-exclusive license (his consent to what would otherwise be an infringing
activity) in the form of mere permission or lack of objection which is equivalent to a non-exclusive license
and is not required to be in writing.[123] The Seventh Circuit has looked at Nimmer's pronouncement
regarding the enforceability of non-exclusive copyright licenses and found that "Nimmer is right."[124]
{43} In order to determine whether such an implied non-exclusive license exists, every objective fact
concerning the transaction should be examined to determine whether it supports such a finding.[125] Several
objective inquiries can be made in this regard, including an assessment of whether the delivery of the
copyrighted material was without warning that its further use would constitute copyright infringement.[126]
It may also be instructive to turn to patent law, where courts have more fully developed methods for
determining whether or not an implied license exists. An implied license to use a patent arises out of
objective conduct by a party which a reasonable person can regard as indicating that some type of agreement
has been reached.[127]
{44} Federal courts have used the implied non-exclusive license doctrine to defeat infringement claims in a
wide variety of settings. In McLean Associates, Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen,[128] for instance,
the creator of computer software brought a copyright infringement action against the corporation that had
formerly employed him. The court held that the evidence supported the finding that a non-exclusive license
could be construed from the circumstances.[129] Another court found a right to reproduce and sell sound
recordings of musical competitions where no written agreement existed based on the theory of implied
license.[130] In another case, a book author was held to have granted a non-exclusive license for another
author to use portions of the book when he allowed the other author a chance to review and revise the
manuscript.[131]
{45} Authors of a vast majority of World Wide Web materials intend their material to be publicly accessible.
While there is no doubt that most of that material is, by default, subject to copyright protection, it is almost
certainly the case that a non-exclusive implied license protects individuals engaged in basic Web browsing
activities that would otherwise be considered infringing. For instance, in order to view a document on the
Web at all, a copy must be transmitted to the viewer's computer, placed in memory, interpreted by browsing
software, and displayed on the viewing party's video display. Taken out of context, this process, in and of
itself, seems to involve a series of acts that might infringe.[132] But these activities are central to the
functionality of the Web in the first place. Finding that they are infringements would create an infringement
when users browsed materials in a way the owner specifically intended, a seemingly absurd result.[133]
{46} An analogous situation exists with computer programs that must be "copied" into a computer's memory
in order to be executed. Federal courts, when faced with these situations, have held that this process involves
a duplication for purposes of the copyright statute."[134] However, recognizing that this posed problems for
the very functionality of computer software, and would make it illegal to use the software in the first place,
Congress enacted a specific provision of the copyright statute to allow individuals to copy computer
programs where the copy is created "as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in
conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner."[135] That provision goes on to authorize
the creation of archival or back-up copies.
{47} With this rationale in mind, one commentator has argued that copying Web pages falls under the Section
117 protection.[136] Recognizing that a strict reading of the copyright statute means that copying,
distribution and display occur when in the process of browsing the World Wide Web, he notes that the [World
Wide Web page] is then transmitted through the computer network and 'fixed' in a RAM of the user's
computer. The work has now been reproduced, implicating the Section 106(1) right of the copyright holder if
the user then saves the transfer work onto his hard disk, assuming the transfer of the work was an authorized
one, the copy on the hard disk is an archival copy authorized by Section 117.[137]
{48} The only caveat to this is that if the reproduction is a work that is already an infringing copy, or if the
reproduction by transmission would be in excess of the rights allowed by the copyright holder, then any
copies made would be infringing ones.[138] If one assumes, however, that no owner puts material on the Web
which is not intended to be transmitted to users all over the world, the initial transfer is not in excess of the
rights allowed by the owner.[139]
{49} It is not clear that the language of Section 117 supports this reasoning. Even if Section 117's unique
protection for computer software does not apply to Web material, it lends support, by analogy, to the idea that
implied non-exclusive licenses exist which authorize the duplication, distribution and display of that material.
Section 117 is, in some respects, nothing more than a codification of what would otherwise be an implied
non-exclusive license.
{50} The relatively few commentators who have analyzed the applicability of the implied license doctrine to
on-line materials have recognized that it must have wide reaching consequences.[140] One commentator
concludes that much of the material distributed over the Internet is made available for free, and that
accessing, and even storing it can come within the scope of creator's implicit or explicit license to the reader.
[141] Others contend that the doctrine of implied consent as applied to on-line materials would "appropriately
allow the transmission and copying necessary to facilitate their use within the electronic realm."[142] Of
course, there are important questions remaining on the exact scope of the implied license that might be
involved here, and the analysis is a fact intensive one. Still, the implied license doctrine will undoubtedly
legitimize most end-user activities browsing activities in such a way as to shield the linking party from a
contributory infringement claim.
B. The Fair Use Defense
{51} Not every use of a copyrighted work is a violation of the law. The statutory notion of fair use was
developed to cover situations where reproducing or using an owner's work is not harmful to the owner, and
the ability to do so is an important part of public discourse.[143] The fair use doctrine acts as a shield against
copyright liability in these instances.
{52} There are four basic statutory elements to a fair use defense: (1) the purpose and character of the use
(including whether the use is commercial or non-commercial in nature); (2) the nature of the copyrighted
(original) work; (3) the amount or proportion that was taken or copied; and (4) the economic impact of the
use on the copyright owner of the original work.[144]
{53} Fair use analysis turns on an examination of the equities involved in the defendant's use, making the
analysis "so flexible as virtually to defy definition."[145] Nonetheless, courts have repeatedly applied the four
factors to invalidate infringement claims where the defendant's actions would otherwise constitute
infringement, and the statute itself was intended to memorialize the judicial doctrine that had been developing
in the common law at the time of its inception.[146]
{54} One might argue that many WWW activities that would otherwise constitute an infringement may be
protected as fair uses under Section 107. This is due to the nature of the Web, where, "if the document is
made freely available for copying in the first place, it is not necessary to inquire whether private copying was
a fair use: fair use excuses prima facie infringements, and where the copying was permitted, there is not even
prima facie infringement."[147]
{55} In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios[148], the United States Supreme Court recognized that, with the
new electronic media copyright, owners sometimes find nothing objectionable about what would otherwise
be viewed as violations or infringements of their rights, thus, supporting a finding that such activities
constitute fair use.[149] In Sony, the court reviewed the status of programs designed to be broadcast on
television and noted that many important producers of national and local television programs find nothing
objectionable about the enlargement of the size of the television audience which results from the practice of
time-shifting for private home use.[150] The court went on to point out that "the user of the copyrighted work
is not required to pay a fee for access to the underlying work."[151] The court seemed to recognize that the
traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon advertiser sponsored free public broadcast
over the public airwaves is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the value of displaying the
works will be received in the form of advertising revenues.[152] The court concluded that because the public
had been "invited to witness [the programs in their] entirety free of charge," copying them for time-shifting
purposes was a "fair use" of the copyrighted work.[153]
{56} Similarly, most of the World Wide Web is freely accessible to the public. Owners of materials placed on
the Web presumably want users to view them, and it seems likely that browsing activities, might be deemed
non-infringing as fair use.[154] As one court has already observed, "absent a commercial or profit-depriving
use, digital browsing is probably a fair-use."[155] In fact, there are strong policy arguments to support such a
conclusion.[156] Thus, in the linking scenarios at issue here, it seems reasonable to conclude that, usually, the
end-user's browsing activities seem to constitute fair use, even if they are browsing "through" an
unauthorized link.
{57} However, unlike the copy made during simple browsing, that is "only necessary because humans cannot
otherwise perceive digital information,"[157] the act of unauthorized linking itself might implicate more
blatant commercial interests. This makes a fair use defense much less likely to be successful in some linking
scenarios, since of the four fair use factors, the effect of the use upon the potential market is the most
important.[158] This is important because an unauthorized link might not conform with the intended revenue
generation scheme that the author of the original work had in mind.[159] For instance, one could imagine the
publisher of a WWW-based newspaper placing advertising material on the "front page" but not on the
subsequent articles. This is a viable revenue generator only if the users peruse the pages in order (they at least
need to see the first page to see the ads). An unauthorized link directly to a subsequent article, however,
would display the content without the user having been exposed to the front page's advertisements. The
situation is worse if you imagine that the potential advertiser has the option of placing an ad with not only the
newspaper, but also with a service like TotalNEWS, that envelopes the content of others in its own
advertisements, a blatantly competitive commercial use. Where this type of economic effect on the ability of
the author to make a profit off of his copyrighted work is apparent, it seems hard to imagine a court deeming
the unauthorized linking itself a fair use.[160]
{58} Since, as noted above, the end user's activities are presumably less commercially motivated, the fair use
defense is much more applicable when assessing whether or not the end user's browsing infringes. As such,
while the linking party itself might not be able to defend its actions on fair use grounds, if the direct
infringement assertion against the end user fails because of the fair use defense, then the contributory
infringement claim against the linking party must fail as well.
 
VI.   Other Potential Basis of Liability
{59} There are other intellectual property doctrines that may prove relevant to unauthorized linking scenarios
and give rise to a civil cause of action.[161] A plaintiff might assert claims under the Lanham Act for
trademark infringement,[162] dilution,[163] or false designation.[164] Barring preemption, a plaintiff might
also turn to a cause of action based on state common law theories including misappropriation, unfair
competition, and contract.[165]
A. Lanham Act
Trademark Infringement
{60} Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act allows a plaintiff to recover for trademark infringement if he can
prove that the defendant used a "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services" without
consent of the mark's owner, and which causes or is likely to cause confusion.[166]
{61} Generally, courts require the plaintiff to prove only that he owns the prior rights in the mark and that the
defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion, deception, or mistake.[167] In determining
whether the use is likely to cause consumer confusion, the courts will generally weigh seven factors: (1) the
degree of similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion; (2) the similarity of products or
services for which the name is used; (3) the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of care likely
to be exercised by consumers; (5) the strength of the complainant's mark; (6) actual confusion; and (7) an
intent on the part of the alleged infringer to palm off his products as those of another.[168]
{62} An unauthorized linking scenario seems likely to involve potential trademark liability if the linking
party's site incorporates marks belonging to the party to whom he is linking. The link alone is probably not
enough. However, where the link in question is of the invoke-to-load type, it is not uncommon for the link to
be designated by an icon or "clickable" text that informs the user about what can be found when the link is
actually invoked. If the icon is a copy or colorable imitation of a trademark, it is possible that a user could be
confused as to whether the linking party is associated with the complainant. An auto-load link alone might
not implicate trademark directly, since the linking party does not need to use a copy or colorable imitation,
but rather only provides a URL enabling the end user to manipulate the plaintiff's mark. If the linking party
uses the plaintiff's mark in some independent manner, liability may attach as it would in other contexts.
{63} Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act sets out a defense to a trademark infringement action for "use,
otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of
anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good
faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin…."[169] This defense
represents the principle that parties should not be able to appropriate descriptive language by way of
trademark registration.[170] Courts have generally required a three-part showing to establish this defense,
viz., (1) good faith, (2) non-trademark use, (3) of a term accurately describing the defendant's goods or
services.[171]
{64} In order to establish the defense, the defendant must show that his use of the mark is descriptive.[172]
To determine the character of the use, courts measure the use against the idea that "if the mark imparts
information directly it is descriptive[;] if it stands for an idea which requires some operation of the
imagination to connect it with the goods, it is suggestive."[173] It is not, however, a requirement that a
descriptive term depict the product itself, but only that the term refer to a characteristic of the product.[174] "
[T]he true test [of descriptiveness] is one of consumer perception--how is [the term] perceived by the average
prospective consumer?" [175]
{65} Finally, the Ninth Circuit has created the "nominative fair use defense."[176] Judge Kozinski, writing
for the court, stated that where the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff's product, rather than
its own, we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense provided he meets the
following three requirements: First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable
without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction
with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.[177]
Dilution
{66} The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("Dilution Act") created a new federal cause of action in
Section 43(c). The law, effective as of January 16, 1996, entitles an "owner of a famous mark" to injunctive
relief against another's commercial use of the mark if the "use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark."[178] In order to prevail on its dilution claim under
federal law, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) ownership of a distinctive trade dress or famous mark, and (2)
actual dilution.[179] The statute also requires the defendant's use to be "commercial" and "in commerce,"
reflecting "the fact that the bill, like the Lanham Act itself, requires some aspect of interstate commerce to be
present before the dilution provision can be triggered."[180]
{67} The Dilution Act defines dilution to mean "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner
of the famous mark and the other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."[181] While
definite standards for analyzing dilution under Section 43(c) have not yet emerged, the statute "protect[s]
famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it."
[182] This language mirrors traditional state dilution analysis, under which dilution can generally be founded
through establishing blurring or tarnishment.[183] Tarnishment is generally said to occur when the plaintiff's
famous mark will suffer negative associations through a defendant's use of the mark in connection with
shoddy goods or unseemly, lewd, or obscene activities.[184] Blurring occurs where "the defendant uses or
modifies the plaintiff's trademark to identify the defendant's goods and services, raising the possibility that the
mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiff's product."[185]
{68} As with trademark infringement, the key to assessing a linking party's liability lies in determining
whether the act of providing the link, in and of itself, constitutes the requisite "use" under the statute.
Recognizing that trademark law and the Dilution Act seek to protect the same subject matter (marks) from
differing harms (doing business on another's reputation and dilution of the mark, respectively), it would
appear that "use" is the same under both theories. It therefore appears that, in the case of unauthorized
linking, creating a link that incorporates a famous mark, the use of which is commercial, in commerce, and
causes dilution, would be proscribed by the Dilution Act.
{69} Under this analysis, the creator of the Dilbert Hack Page would likely escape liability, for, while the
Dilbert mark is certainly famous and this use will likely cause blurring dilution, the use is neither
commercial, nor in commerce. TotalNEWS, however, seems likely to incur liability under such a claim. At
least some, if not all, of the marks used by TotalNEWS on its page, as first presented to the viewer, are
famous. Moreover, the commercial use in commerce elements appear to be met by virtue of the advertising
revenue generated by the page. Finally, the use of the famous marks will almost certainly cause dilution as
defined by the statute.[186] If, however, TotalNEWS were to avoid actually incorporating the marks into its
own HTML, instead, using generic references to the linked sites that do not actually "use" the mark, then
there might not be the requisite use, thereby escaping liability.
False Designation
{70} The Lanham Act also creates a statutory tort allowing recovery for false designations of origin and false
representations in Section 43(a).[187] In general, a defendant is liable for false designations of origin and
false descriptions if his conduct is likely to cause confusion,[188] or "in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities."[189] The plain language of the statute indicates that likelihood of
confusion is not a required element for a claim to false designation under the statute's "false or misleading"
language. On the other hand, if likelihood of confusion is shown, the statute does not require the plaintiff to
prove the falsity of the defendant's representation. In practice, a false representation claim arises when a
trademark or name or distinguishing characteristics of a product or service is used in a false or deceptive
manner, either to the misrepresented fact or to the association between the advertiser and mark owner.[190]
The statute is broadly construed[191] and covers both registered and unregistered marks.[192]
{71} Unlike trademark infringement and dilution, the false designation provision of the Lanham Act may
have the flexibility to encompass unauthorized linking activities like those described here. Where an
unauthorized link involves framing, for instance, it seems very possible that, absent clear disclaimers,
confusion might occur. As one court noted when looking at a situation where one website framed another, "in
short, a visitor to [the linking] site could easily have the impression that they were actually at [the other]
site."[193]
B. State Common Law Claims
Misappropriation
{72} Misappropriation is a type of unfair competition recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
which the plaintiff complains of unauthorized appropriation by a competing defendant of property in which
the plaintiff has invested substantial time, skill, and money.[194] While early cases held that federal law
preempts state common laws providing protection for facts,[195] some modern courts have held that Section
301 of the 1976 Copyright Act does not preempt state law protection of facts.[196]
{73} Before its decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,[197] the United States Supreme Court held in
International News Service v. Associated Press[198] that under general federal common law,
misappropriation of "hot news" was unfair competition and, hence, actionable.[199] There, the defendant,
I.N.S., was pirating news stories originally published by A.P.[200] The Court upheld an order barring the
defendant from such action, noting that "[the news developed by AP at significant expense] has all the
attributes of property necessary for determining that a misappropriation of it by a competitor is unfair
competition because contrary to good conscience."[201]
{74} While Erie may cast some doubt on the continued viability of I.N.S. in federal law, the misappropriation
type of unfair competition claim lives on in state courts.[202] Indeed, as the recent Second Circuit decision in
National Basketball Association v. Motorola[203] indicates, misappropriation as a cause of action still
survives in some form. In that action, the National Basketball Association sued Motorola for unauthorized
use (in this case rebroadcast) of professional basketball game scores during the course of the game.[204] The
court held that a "hot news" misappropriation claim lies only where the following elements are present: (1)
the plaintiff generates or collects information at some cost or expense, (2) the value of the information is
highly time-sensitive, (3) the defendant's use of the information constitutes free-riding on the plaintiff's costly
efforts to generate or collect it, (4) the defendant's use of the information is in direct competition with a
product or service offered by the plaintiff, and (5) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the
plaintiff would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be
substantially threatened.[205]
{75} Interestingly, even the whittled-down misappropriation claim recognized by the Second Circuit may
face constitutional preemption. First, such state protection of facts and ideas may so offend the federal
statutory scheme embodied in the 1976 Act as to require its preemption under the Constitution's Supremacy
Clause.[206] Second, as Professor Goldstein notes, "state protection of ideas and facts may in certain cases
offend constitutional provisions, specifically the first amendment's guarantee's of free speech and press as
incorporated by the fourteenth amendment."[207] This latter theory of preemption would seem to make sense
here, as the first element set out by the Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff have collected or generated
information at some cost to himself. "Information" would seem to indicate first amendment protected facts or
ideas. While one might argue that "information" also encompasses the expression of ideas, the second
element's requirement that the information be "highly time-sensitive," seems to support the notion that
"information," as used by the court, includes only facts or ideas, as it is difficult to imagine how expression
would be "highly time-sensitive." The copyright statue was crafted to exclude protection for such
"information," and it seems plausible that any scheme that works as an end-around to the copyright statute is
subject to critical review under preemption doctrines.[208]
{76} Notwithstanding preemption problems, though, the surviving state law misappropriation theory may
provide relief in some cases of unauthorized linking. In fact patterns like the Dilbert Hack page, however, the
fact that United Feature Syndicate (UM) and Mr. Wallach were not in competition precludes recovery by UM
under a misappropriation claim. The TotalNEWS scenario seems a more likely candidate for
misappropriation. The plaintiffs there could likely show that they collect and generate highly time-sensitive
information (news). TotalNEWS' use of this information to generate advertising revenues seems to constitute
"free-riding" on the plaintiffs' efforts. Moreover, TotalNEWS' use of this information to generate advertising
revenue appears to be in direct competition with the plaintiffs' generation of such revenue, even though the
two are not in direct competition in the news gathering field. Finally, the case could be made that
TotalNEWS' free-riding would act as a disincentive against the continued existence of the plaintiffs' news
gathering services or, at a minimum, their quality would be substantially threatened. Presumably, the loss of
advertising revenue to a TotalNEWS-like competitor would at least have an adverse affect on the quality of
the plaintiffs' news gathering efforts. TotalNEWS could be said to be "endeavoring to reap where it has not
sown . . . in order to divert a material portion of the profit from those who have earned it to the those who
have not . . ."[209]
Passing (Palming) Off
{77} As noted above, state common law unfair competition claims generally track the requirements for
recovery under Lanham Act § 43(a).[210] The two elements which must generally be established in order to
sustain a cause of action for passing off are: (1) plaintiff's use of its trade name has acquired a secondary
meaning; and (2) the similarity of the name used by the defendant's place of business would be likely to
confuse the public.[211] Since, generally, ''the same facts which would support an action for trademark
infringement would also support an action for unfair competition,"[212] much of the analysis in the
trademark infringement discussion above would apply here as well.
Contract
{78} Since federal copyright law denies protection for ideas, some plaintiffs will be forced to turn to state
law for relief. By contract, parties can protect both those subject matters within and without the realm of the
Copyright Act. According to the Seventh Circuit, at least, some contracts to protect intellectual property
avoid preemption and are viable.[213] There, the court upheld the viability of "shrinkwrap" licenses
governing commercial software products.[214] By analogy, a license on a web page that plainly, and within
the dictates of contract law, provide for viewing of the web product only upon acceptance of the terms of the
license might be argued to create a valid and enforceable contract between the parties that allows certain uses
of the copyrighted material at issue to be deemed a breach of contract.[215]
{79} Given that the end-user, not the linking party is manipulating the material, such terms would govern the
user's actions, not the linking party's. If those terms prohibit the end user from viewing or loading the
materials via unauthorized links, then, arguably, the implied license to engage in normal browsing activities is
limited in such a way as to make the direct linker a direct infringer in some cases. If that occurs, then the
linking party becomes subject to a claim of contributory infringement of both the participatory and means-to-
infringe varieties based on the users' underlying infringement.
 
VII.   Conclusion
{80} As Ethan Katsh points out in his insightful book, Law in a Digital World,[216] "The new [digital
hypertext] environment, in which there are new links, new opportunities to communication and new tools for
creating, is one that encourages changes in how we look upon created works and in how we describe and
think about them."[217] Perhaps, as some have suggested, the focus should not be on copyright and
established intellectual property at all, but rather on the nature of the use and the author's ability to control it.
[218] There are, for instance, technologies that a site owner can employ to block unauthorized linking
without turning to legal recourse.[219] We might rely upon more sophisticated technologies that effectively
protect the author's interests in copyrighted material by more precisely tracking, and accounting for the
public's use of the material. In a world where traditional legal doctrines break down, there is at least some
temptation to turn to this sort of self-regulation as a means of maintaining order.[220] This temptation,
however, may ultimately prove to be shortsighted, as such private ordering schemes might have unintended
consequences that threaten fundamental freedoms.[221] Whether it is through a restructuring of current
intellectual property law principles, or some more imaginative solution, it seems hard to imagine that an
activity as fundamental as linking will be left clouded in legal uncertainty for too long. But, as seen here, the
current intellectual property framework strains, at best, to provide the analytical tools necessary to address
the issue.
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